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Abstract
!e present article attempts to establish the following propositions: !e remarks to be found in the initial segment 
of the so-called Saᒢbandha-Samuddeśa of Bhartᒮharti’s Vākyapadīya, or Trikāᒤᒅī, can be interpreted in a way which 
permits to regard them as the expression of a valid theoretical view.  It is important to investigate the possible existence 
of a sound theoretical motivation in philosophical treatises not only under the perspective of philosophical analysis but 
even in the framework of traditional textual exegesis irrespective of whether the textual sources represent a Western 
or a non-Western tradition of thought.
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La sección de versos 1-29 en Vakyapad ya III.3 ¿Está 
basada en un sana motivación teórica?
Resumen 
El siguiente artículo pretende establecer las siguientes proposiciones: los comentarios a ser encontrados en el segmento 
inicial del llamado Saᒢbandha-Samuddeśa de Bhartᒮharti’s Vākyapadīya, o Trikāᒤᒅī, se pueden interpretar de manera 
que permite a considerarlas como la expresión de una concepción teórica válida. Es importante investigar la posible 
existencia de una sana motivación teórica en los tratados +losó+cos no solo bajo la perspectiva del análisis +losó+co, 
sino también en el marco de una exégesis textual tradicional independientemente de que las fuentes textuales repre-
senten un pensamiento tradicional occidental o no occidental.
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É a seção de versos 1-29 em Vakyapad ya III.3  
baseada em uma saudável motivação teórica?
Resumo
O seguinte artigo pretende estabelecer as seguintes proposições: Os comentarios acharam no segmento inicial do 
chamado Saᒢbandha-Samuddeśa de de Bhartᒮharti’s Vākyapadīya, ou Trikāᒤᒅī, se podem interpretar de manera que 
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permite considerarlas como a expressão de uma válida vista teórica. É importante investigar a posible existencia de 
uma saudável motivação teórica nos tratados +losó+cos não solo baixo a perspectiva do análise +losó+co mas  tam-
bem no enquadramento de uma exegese tradicional e textual independente de que as fontes textuales representen um 
pensamento tradicional ocidental ou não occidental.     
Palavras-chave: Vākyapadīya, linguagem, signi+cado, interpretação
!e claim that the section of the verses 1-29 of the 
Saᒢbandha-Samuddeśa (SS) can be connected with 
a theoretical stance which is both objectively sound 
and plausible in our eyes will be substantiated in the 
subsequent section by focusing on a set of verses which 
presumably represent the most central ingredients of a 
theoretical tenet concerning (natural) language. !e task is 
to show that even in cases where individual remarks could 
be interpreted as representing false or highly questionable 
theorems against the background of purely linguistic and 
philological considerations, there are always also readings 
allowing to understand them as the expression of a valid 
theoretical outlook and harmonizing with linguistic and 
philological criteria at least equally well. It has to be ac-
knowledged, nevertheless, that in a number of instances 
those interpretations diFer from ones which had been 
advocated in previous studies on the text.
We presume that the last verse 29 within the segment 
which is considered here expresses a pivotal theorem. It 
reads as follows:
indriyāᒤāᒢ svaviᒲayeᒲv anādir yogyatā yathā /
anādir arthair śabdānāᒢ saᒢbandho yogyatā tathā2
and could be literally rendered as follows:
2 In the same manner as the beginningless +tness of the 
sense-faculties with respect to their objects the relation of 
words with their objects is a beginningless +tness.
It can be assumed that a paraphrase, such as:
In the same manner as the relation between the sense-
faculties and their objects consists in a +tness without 
beginning also the relation between words and their objects 
is a beginningless +tness.
Would not substantially distort the intended import of 
the original. Anyhow, in view of the fact that the idea of 
an eternal relation intimates the supposition of an eternal 
existence of the items which are related, the problem 
arises whether the tenet formulated in the quoted verse 
implies the eternal existence of words or of other kinds 
of linguistic expressions. In this connection a remark to 
be found in Houben 1995:148 deserves to be taken into 
account. It points out that even the term nitya (‘eternal’) 
is sometimes to be understood as ‘relatively permanent’ or 
‘continuous’. Accordingly the word ‘beginningless’ can be 
plausibly interpreted as possessing a more modest import 
entailing merely the non-existence of some de+nite ascer-
tainable beginning. !is in its turn permits to reconcile 
the pertinent theorem both with common sense and the 
notion of a diFerence akin to the distinction embodied 
in the current concepts of linguistic types and linguistic 
tokens. After all, fairly common observations are apt to 
engender the idea that linguistic units produced either in 
the oral or written medium at a particular occasion instan-
tiate linguistic items belonging to a linguistic system, as 
for example a natural language, such that the same items 
instantiated at a particular occasion are –or at least could 
be– equally instantiated at earlier or later times. !ere is 
no compelling reason to interpret verse 29 as promot-
ing the tenet of the eternality of words, as advocated in 
certain schools in India. Rather the pertinent statement 
can be –and presumably should be– understood as the 
propagation of a proposition which everybody ought to 
admit irrespective of any speci+c theoretical outlook, leav-
ing room for the adoption of the tenet of the eternality 
of linguistic objects in the stricter sense as a possibility 
without entailing it. As far as the pertinent import of the 
term which has been rendered above by the word ‘object’ 
is concerned, it appears fairly probable that the occurrence 
of the lexeme artha- in verse 29 deserves to be interpreted 
in the light of the same lexem in verse 1 of the SS. !is 
means that the import of arthair (śabdānāᒢ) equals the 
import of the expression bāhyo ‘rthaᒒ (‘external object’) 
occurring in the +rst verse. To be sure, this circumstance 
insinuates a somewhat ‘antiquated’ outlook on matters of 
semantics according to which words are generally related 
to objects in the way that they ‘stand for them3, that 
they are proxies or surrogates for other objects diFerent 
from them.
2. Inasmuch as variant readings are not potentially relevant for the argumentation they are not mentioned here.
3. Presumably one should concur with Houben 1995:148 in rejecting the thesis that the expression ’external‘ needs to be interpreted as implying the 
physical nature of the concerned items. Possibly the expression merely reKects the view that, at least in the vast majority of cases, words are not being 
used for referring to themselves.
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In this connection it seems imperative to discard any 
considerations about the personal beliefs of the author of 
the text and instead focus on the question whether the 
statement formulated in verse 29 necessitates the above 
described claim. It is almost a truism that the expression 
artha- is highly equivocal and that apart from uses in the 
sense of ‘thing’, ‘object’ it encompasses employments in 
the sense of ‘meaning’, ‘sense’, ‘content’ as well as others. 
Against this background it should be legitimate to inter-
pret verse 29 as advancing a tenet which reads as follows:
In the same manner as sense faculties possess a per-
manent capacity for the cognition of particular objects, 
such that the sense of vision is +t for the grasp of visual 
qualities and no others, the sense of hearing is +t for the 
grasp of auditory qualities and no others, and so on for 
the remaining sense faculties, so also words as items which 
belong to a linguistic system are +t to convey particular 
meanings whenever they are employed or encountered at 
particular occasions.
It seems that a re-formulation in terms of linguistic 
types and linguistic tokens preserves the gist of the idea, 
if it is presented as follows:
!e meanings of linguistic tokens are determined by the 
meanings of corresponding linguistic types.
In this manner the relevant tenet is extricated from 
serious theoretical problems. Whereas it is highly doubt-
ful that words such as ‘not’, ‘or’, ‘and’ and many others 
are proxies for particular (presumably abstract) objects, 
nobody would deny that those items possess a meaning, 
if ‘possess a meaning’ amounts to the same as ‘being mea-
ningful’4. !e circumstance that the analogy with sense 
organs or sense faculties could insinuate the impossibility 
of linguistic synonymy should not create a momentous 
diLculty. Even it it were supposed that sense qualities of 
some sort can be grasped by at most one sense organ, it 
would be illegitimate to infer that the situation that diFe-
rent expressions possess the capacity to convey identical 
meanings is ruled out by the tenet propagated in verse 29. 
As it holds good for similes and analogies in general one 
ought to suppose that even here the comparison pertains 
to particular aspects only and does not entail that the two 
situations are alike in every respect. A more signi+cant pro-
blem is posed by the fact that the proposition formulated 
in verse 29 does not indicate any diFerence
Between individual words and complex expressions 
constituted by compositions or concatenations of ele-
mentary linguistic items like words or morphemes. !is 
could reKect a view according to which language consists 
of a ‘platonic’ universe of in+nitely many expressions of 
any length and complexity such that every item posses-
ses a pre-determined meaning in the same manner as 
individual words. Again it is imperative to abstain from 
considerations regarding possible personal opinions of 
the writer of the text as well as from the question of the 
tenability of views advanced by other theoreticians before 
or during the creation of the SS concerning the manner in 
which meanings of complex units like sentences depend 
on meanings of their constituents. Conceivably none 
of those views is acceptable in the +nal analysis. But in 
the present connection this question is irrelevant. What 
matters is rather the fact that the theorem advanced in 
the pertinent verse can be reconciled with any account 
pertaining to meanings of complex linguistic items. In 
order to bring the tenet into agreement with the view 
that sentences are not atomic or indivisible semantic 
units like certain words or morphemes, not a rejection is 
required but at most a modi+cation or explication. !is 
can be achieved by adding the theoretical ingredient that 
the rules regulating the computation of the meanings of 
complex expressions on the basis of the meanings of their 
constituents is given independently of the meanings of 
individual linguistic tokens. It deserves to be emphasized 
that there is no reason to suppose that this amendment 
would distort the author’s intention. !e very lack of any 
reference to complex linguistic units could derive from 
the circumstance that the writer of the text deliberately 
intended to leave the issue of the constitution of meanings 
of complex units open at this stage of discussion.
However a danger of inadequacy persists due to the 
existence of phenomena which apparently militate aga-
inst the view that the meanings of linguistic tokens are 
determined by the meanings of linguistic types. Let us 
suppose that somebody (assertively) utters the sentence
(1) Wine is not wine.
Isn’t it conceivable that a speaker uttering (1) could 
mean quite diFerent things in diFerent contexts? Could 
not an assertive utterance of (1) equally well convey the 
proposition that there are diFerent types of wine which 
signi+cantly diFer regarding their quality or that the prices 
4. !is exempts the pertinent tenet also from the reproach of ignoring insights which have been attained by other theoreticians of the Indian tradition. 
Particularly representatives of the philosophy of Madhyamaka, such as Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, appear to have clearly recognized the naivety 
of the opinion that all words stand for objects and that accordingly even the word ‘nothing’ needs to be a proxy for some particular entity, an item 
which might be designated by the expression ‘the nothing’. 
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of diFerent wines can diFer to a considerable degree or 
that it is not the case that everything which is passed oF as 
wine is also wine in actual fact or, supposed the expression 
is used somewhat elliptically presupposing a constituent 
like ‘for ….’ after ‘wine’, that somebody, perhaps the 
speaker himself, is a wine connoisseur who is able to 
perceive qualitative merits or de+ciencies and attaches 
importance to such diFerences? In this connection it is 
appropriate to point out that the writer of the SS has, at 
least to some extent, taken this phenomenon into account. 
!e +rst verse of the SS reads as follows:
jñānaᒢ prayoktur bāhyo rthaᒒ svarūpaᒢ ca pratīyate /
śabdair uccaritais teᒲāᒢ saᒢbandhaᒒ samavasthitaᒒ //
It can be literally rendered as follows:
By words that are uttered a cognition of the one who 
uses [them], an external object and the own form [of the 
words] are comprehended. !eir relation is +xed.
!e signi+cance of this verse for the pertinent issue 
emerges as soon as one observes a distinction between the 
meaning of linguistic expressions and that what somebody 
using an expression with a particular meaning means 
by using them (in this meaning). Whereas the theorem 
formulated in verse 29 should be understood as relating 
to the +rst item, viz. that which linguistic expressions 
mean themselves, something which might be termed the 
‘meaning content’ of linguistic expressions, the deviances 
observed in the previous paragraph pertain to the second 
issue, viz. that what somebody might mean by using 
meaningful expressions. To be sure, the above quoted 
verse presents an indication of this diFerence at best in a 
fairly veiled form. It could even militate against the last 
segment of the verse, if the formulation teᒲāᒢ saᒢbandhaᒒ 
samavasthitaᒒ (‘!eir relation is +xed’) would represent a 
statement implying that the relation between words and 
‘cognitions’ of those employing them at some occasion 
is +xed in the same manner as the connection between 
words and their ‘objects’ or meaning contents or (possibly) 
the relation between uttered words and their ‘own form’5. 
It is a realistic possibility that the writer of the SS did 
not envisage that ‘meaning-intentions’ of language users 
should be encompassed in the range of the concept re-
presented by the expression jñānaᒢ prayoktur (‘cognition 
of user’) and that he intended to refer in the +rst place to 
cognitive states, such as pictorial representations of objects 
or situations in somebody’s mind or perhaps also beliefs 
indicated by the utterance of sentences. In spite of that, it 
is signi+cant that in itself the distinction between semantic 
properties and psychological or cognitive states of subjects 
employing linguistic expressions, which is de+nitely ac-
knowledged in verse 1 of the SS, permits to account for 
the diFerence between meanings of expressions deriving 
from linguistic conventions or rules on the one hand and 
communicative intentions of language users on the other 
hand. !e decisive point is, however, that even if this 
contention were not admitted, it would be illegitimate 
to reject the tenet formulated in verse 29 in view of the 
occurrence of speci+c and possibly novel communicative 
intentions connected with the employment of meaningful 
expressions. !e fact persists that, in all probability, the 
theorem formulated in the +nal verse of the considered 
segment of the SS should speci+cally refer to properties 
of linguistic objects and not to language users.
Nevertheless, there are additional problems which 
must be accounted for. !e +rst diLculty has to do 
with the phenomenon of language learning. Obviously 
a child during the process of the acquisition of linguistic 
competence possesses an ability to correctly understand 
novel linguistic expressions even without prior knowledge 
of relevant lexical conventions or pertinent syntactic and 
semantic rules. Presumably the possibility of success in 
this respect relies, among other factors, on the capability 
to entertain correct hypotheses concerning mental states, 
in particular communicative intentions of other speakers, 
as well as the possibility to make correct judgements 
about what is and what is not meaningful to say in some 
individual situation. Here the term ‘meaningful’ possesses 
an import that is related, but nevertheless diFers from 
the one in which the word has been used above. It could 
be paraphrased by terms such as ‘purposeful’, ‘relevant’, 
‘reasonable’, ‘having a point’ and other similar ones. If it 
is true that sometimes non-arbitrary assessments can be 
made about psychological states of other subjects and, 
most of all, concerning the reasonability or rationality 
of particular kinds of actions in speci+c situations even 
without linguistic knowledge, then a possibility exists to 
account for the origination of linguistic conventions in 
human history, so that the hypothesis of the beginningless 
existence of language becomes futile. But this could create 
a predicament for the view represented by verse 29 of the 
SS only if it entailed the strong contention of the eternality 
of words or other linguistic expressions. Given, however, 
that it was not the intention of the writer of the text to 
advocate this thesis, the objection becomes irrelevant.
5. In the present context the import of the term svarūpa- (‘own form’) need not be discussed. (More detailed investigations on this topic are to be found 
in Houben 1995 as well as in Oetke 2012:65F) 
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!erefore primary attention must be paid to another 
problem. Meanings of linguistic expressions can be 
explained either in the way that for expressions already 
possessing some meaning their pre-existing meaning is 
made known to somebody who might not yet know this 
fact or in the way that novel meanings for already existing 
items or for not previously existing elementary units or 
concatenations of elementary units are stipulated. !e 
second variety plays a most prominent role in the Indian 
tradition of grammar and linguistics. Many pertinent 
specimens can be found in oldest sources like Pāᒤini’s 
Aᒲᒷādhyāyī. Verse 3 of the SS, which reads:
asyāyaᒢ vācako vācya iti ᒲaᒲᒷhyā pratīyate /
yogaᒒ śabdārthayos tattvam apy ato vyapadiśyate
‘!is is a signi+er/an expression of this [and this] is its 
[correlate] [which is] to be signi+ed/expressed’, thus the 
connection between word and [its] object is comprehended 
by the sixth case ending (= the genitive suLx); hence also a 
state of things is pointed out.
Intimates that the writer of the SS was in the present 
context fully aware of the phenomenon of linguistic ex-
planation, at least as far as the +rst variety is concerned. 
On the other hand, it is diLcult to see, why the possibility 
of explaining existing (conventional) meanings should 
threaten the thesis advanced in verse 29, which should be 
perfectly compatible with the assumption that knowledge 
about meaning could be acquired. Hence it is not com-
pletely unreasonable to suspect that the very occurrence 
of the verse in the present context indicates that the writer 
of the SS was concerned about the second variety. !is 
conjecture can be sustained by the deliberation that the 
admission of the +rst type of explanation urges one to ad-
mit the possibility of the second type of explanation. !e 
following is an outline of the pertinent reasoning: In si-
tuations of ordinary linguistic explanation somebody who 
previously did not know the meaning of an expression is 
enabled to know its meaning and successfully employ it 
in communication. But for the acquisition of his linguistic 
competence it is not only not necessary that he knew the 
meaning before but even any later knowledge about pre-
vious ways of using the pertinent expression is in principle 
irrelevant. It suLces that he believes or acts on the pre-
sumption that if he employs the expression in accordance 
with the explanation then he will use it correctly. Even this 
is still more than required for communicative success: In 
principle the instructed person could successfully employ 
a linguistic unit if he supposes that he will successfully 
communicate if he follows the instruction disregarding 
the question of correctness, provided that other persons 
with whom he communicates act on the same premises. 
Now it is not any more diLcult to recognize the potential 
threat for the tenet propagated in verse 29: Suppose some 
natural language could be traced back to some original 
instructor who for the +rst time attributed meanings to 
all or to a considerable number of its expressions; then 
the contention that the ‘+tness’ between expressions and 
their meaning is without any de+nite beginning would be 
untenable at least with respect to the pertinent language. 
In this regard there is no need to hypothesize the tenet of 
an absolutely eternal connection between words and mea-
nings. !e mere supposition of the non-existence of some 
de+nite beginning suLces for making the theorem vul-
nerable. For achieving his purpose an original instructor 
could exploit the stratagem of inducing in the instructed 
subjects a false belief to the eFect that his instruction is in 
accordance with some previously established norm. But 
if the previously expounded argument is correct, this is 
not necessary. One could establish a convention by this 
method by instructing a relevant number of people as to 
how expressions should be used by them.
As a matter of fact, the above delineated contemplation 
is still insuLcient for a de+nite disproval of the tenet of 
a beginning less connection between expressions and 
meanings, and the reason is quite obvious. !e envisaged 
method of instruction supposedly relies on the employ-
ment of meaningful linguistic items for the explanation 
of novel meaning connections. Hence the advocate of the 
tenet of the beginning less nature of meaning relations 
could retort that it amounts to a gross misunderstanding 
of his thesis if it were taken as ruling out the possibility of 
establishing novel meaning connexions. !e decisive point 
is rather that some meaning relations must exist which 
did not come into being at some de+nite time. But now 
the opponent could reply as follows: !e understanding 
required for the subsequent success of the explanation(s) 
is not an understanding of a person but an understanding 
of linguistic expressions. As long as it can be taken for 
granted that every understanding of linguistic expressions 
relies on a grasp of their previously
Established meanings, the argument of the advocate of 
a beginningless nature of some meaning relations might be 
valid. It might be also admitted that in ordinary meaning 
explanations the recognition of previously unknown mea-
ning relations relies on a grasp of the established meanings 
of the explanatory sentences. But where is the proof that 
it must always be like that? !e fact that something holds 
true for explanatory sentences encountered in ordinary 
life does not de+nitely prove that the same holds good for 
explanatory items in general. If it could be consistently 
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assumed that there are some sentences, presumably devia-
ting from the ordinary ones, which are self-explanatory in 
the sense that they simultaneously express some meaning 
and explain it, then the contention of the proponent of 
beginningless meaning relations lacks a sound theoreti-
cal basis. !us it emerges that a proof to the eFect that 
self-explanatory linguistic items cannot exist possesses 
a vital importance for the credibility of the contention 
formulated in verse 29 of the SS.
Against this background the question attains relevan-
ce whether the author of the pertinent textual section 
has provided a proof or the attempt of a proof of the 
proposition that self-explanatory sentences cannot exist. 
Our conjecture is that the investigated segment of the SS 
contains more than a mere eFort to substantiate this theo-
rem. Given that on the one hand a considerable degree of 
equivocation exhibited by pertinent formulations impedes 
straightforward judgments and on the other hand com-
paratively detailed deliberations concerning philological 
and grammatical issues have been presented elsewhere6, 
a condensed exposition appears legitimate, even if it is 
fragmentary in some respects. Verse 4 possesses central 
importance in the present context. It reads as follows:
nābhidhānaᒢ svadharmeᒤa saᒢbandhasyāsti vācakam /
atyantaparatantratvād rūpaᒢ nāsyāpadiśyate
!ere is no term which is a signi+er/expression of the relation 
in accordance with its own characteristic; due to complete 
dependence its form is not indicated7
A problem lies in the circumstance that the quoted 
verse is suited to arouse an impression of perversity as if 
somebody denies that one can speak about something 
about which he attempts to say something. Apart from 
this a contention to the eFect that some relation cannot 
be ‘signi+ed’ by any term appears disconcerting not only 
for relations in general, but also for semantic relations in 
particular. Common sense would rather suggest that it 
is not only possible to speak about meaning relations in 
some broad sense of the word ‘about’ but that it should 
be even feasible to refer to them, particularly by singular 
terms, such as:
!e meaning relation between ‘München’ and Munich
And similar ones. Since in the preceding verse the con-
tention has been voiced that relations between words and 
their objects or meanings are indicated by the sixth case 
ending or the genitive suLx one can be tempted to surmise 
that the subsequent verse should embody the claim that 
meaning relations can be indicated by no other means 
than genitive suLxes. !e problem is, however, that an 
argument deriving from the premise that something can 
be indicated by some means the conclusion that it cannot 
be indicated by any other means is not only implausible 
but absolutely ridiculous. In view of the fact that the 
theorem that self-explanatory linguistic items cannot exist 
contains the idea of self-reference as its ingredient it would 
not be eccentric to suspect that verse 4 does not embody a 
claim about the possibility of signifying relations by terms 
in general but rather concerns the question as to whether 
terms could signify their own meaning relations. One 
could surmise in addition that the expression svadharmeᒤa 
which had been rendered above by ‘in accordance with its 
own characteristic’ and which could be equally rendered 
by ‘according to its own (speci+c) property’ has been used 
to indicate this restriction, so that a suitable explication 
could be given by ‘in the form of its own property’ or ‘as 
a quality which belongs to (the term) itself ’.
!e proposition that words do not signify their own 
meaning-relations appears in fact highly plausible consi-
dering, for example, that the German word ‘München’, 
as ordinarily understood, designates the town which is 
called ‘Munich’ in English and not any relation between 
the word and some object, a relation which might be, ne-
vertheless, speci+able by diFerent terms like “the relation 
of denotation between ‘München’ and Munich” or “the 
meaning relation between ‘München’ and Munich” or 
similar ones. But there are still diLculties which need to 
be solved. It is hard to see, why the fact that proper names 
or other singular terms denoting or meaning something or 
the other do not simultaneously denote or mean a relation 
between themselves and the items denoted or meant by 
them possesses relevance for the tenet that self-explanatory 
sentences are not possible. In this connection it is impor-
tant to note that presumably the writer of the SS did not 
attribute importance to terminological distinctions regar-
ding various semantic relations connected with diFerent 
categories of expressions, such as names or singular terms, 
predicates and sentences. Accordingly one is entitled to 
assume that the term vācaka- (‘signi+er’, ‘signifying’) does 
not take such diFerences into account and exhibits a sort 
of neutrality which is also shared by the English word 
‘mean’. Hence the remark represented by the +rst half of 
verse 4 is not intended to refer to relations between names 
6. E.g. in Houben 1995, as well as in Oetke 2012:45-211 and Oetke 2013:12-25. 
7. In Houben 1995 the following translation is given: !ere is no word that signi+es the relation according to its speci+c property. Because it is extremely 
dependent, its form cannot be pointed out.
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or singular terms and their correlated meaning objects in 
particular but should be taken as applying to expressions 
of any linguistic category, thus also to sentences. It follows 
that with respect to items, such as:
(2) ‘München’ (in German) means Munich.
The pertinent thesis entails that anything which 
the sentence means or expresses is not simultaneously 
something which the same sentence explains as its own 
meaning. !is contention is highly plausible because it 
does not militate against the natural supposition that the 
meaning of (2) can be explained by employing a sentence 
diFerent from it, such as:
(3) “‘München’ (in German) means Munich” means 
that (the German word) ‘München’ means Munich.
or alternatively:
(3‘) !e sentence designated by the symbol ‘(2)’ means 
that (the German word) ‘München’ means Munich.
!is should not be the last word, however, because, 
if the pertinent conjecture regarding the overreaching 
argumentative aim is correct, it cannot be suLcient to 
appeal to the observation that usually explanatory sen-
tences diFer from their explananda, but it needs to be 
shown that the same function which diFerent explanatory 
sentences can perform cannot be performed by the expla-
nanda themselves. It would be of no avail to resort to the 
claim that sentences cannot refer to their own meanings 
and can never express any truth about them, because this 
contention appears to be blatantly false, as vindicated by 
the following example:
(4) !e meaning of the sentence which is being uttered 
by me just now is a meaning of an English sentence.
Or
(4’) !at which the sentence which is being uttered by 
me just now expresses can be expressed in English.
Given that (4) or (4’) are meaningful English sentences 
they must exhibit a meaning content which can be expres-
sed in English. Hence one should assume that (4) and (4’) 
express something true8. It seems that substantially more 
is required for vindicating a tenet of the impossibility of 
self-explanations. For identifying the decisive ingredient 
which is still lacking one needs to draw attention to the 
fact that the above quoted sentences, although purporting 
to refer to or to say something about their own meaning 
do not furnish any explanation of their meanings. In 
order to see more clearly why those items fail to perform 
such a function it is appropriate to consider the following 
example:
(5) !e favourite colour of Sarah Wagenknecht is better 
suited to evoke romantic associations than the favourite 
colour of Hans Dietrich Genscher.
Presumably many people would have greatest diLcul-
ties in assessing the truth value of (5) although they might 
be disposed to immediately assent to a claim expressed by
(6) !e colour red is better suited to evoke romantic 
associations than the colour yellow.
!e reason is obviously that in the case of (5) the two 
de+nite descriptions Kanking the relational expression 
‘….is better suited to evoke romantic associations than 
____’ do not reveal by themselves which particular 
colour is referred to, whereas in the case of (6) the two 
descriptions do not leave room for any uncertainty in this 
respect. In contrast to (6) mere understanding of the sense 
of the singular terms occurring in (5) can never suLce 
for the possibility of recognizing which individual item is 
meant9. On the terminological level the diFerence could 
be accounted for by distinguishing between ‘representing’ 
and ‘not representing’ singular terms or ways of referring 
to objects, such that the +rst variety is only exhibited 
by (6). Evidently a meaning explanation has to exploit 
a representing reference to the meaning to be revealed, 
and it is for this reason that (4) or (4’) unlike (3) and (3’) 
cannot serve for the elucidation of a meaning. !e success 
of a meaning explanation specifying a meaning relation 
between linguistic items and their meaning crucially 
depends on the possibility of de+nitely identifying both 
relata which are concerned. Now it can be recognized why 
8. !e fact that the word relation does not appear in those sentences is irrelevant because the tenet of the impossibility of self-explanation does not 
demand that explanatory sentences contain the expression ‘meaning relation’ as their constituent. Nevertheless, the pertinent point could be equally 
made by using the word ‘relation’ in a sentence, such as: 
 !e meaning relation of which the sentence which is being uttered by me just now is one of its relata is a relation which has an English 
sentence as one of its relata.
 Otherwise a lot of things can be said about relations as such, e.g. that they are or are not reKexive, symmetric, transitive etc.
9. !e diFerence emerges also in modal constructions. Whereas 
 !e color red could be the colour yellow. 
 8is obviously false, this does not hold true for 
 !e favourite colour of Sarah Wagenknecht could be the favourite colour of Hans Dietrich Genscher.
 – One must not be misled by the circumstance that both persons might be disinclined to acknowledge this.
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it is inconceivable that an explanatory sentence explains 




S means that P.
where ‘S’ stands for a linguistic item and ‘M’ for some 
meaning which a linguistic item possesses and ‘P’ for some 
propositional content which a linguistic item expresses if 
it is a declarative sentence (possessing such content), the 
supposition that some replacement for ‘M’ provides a 
representing reference to the meaning of the explanatory 
sentence or that ‘P’ presents the content which is expres-
sed by the explanatory sentence is incongruous. Even 
supposing that sometimes meanings or meaning contents 
of complex expressions might be identical with the mea-
nings or contents of some of their constituents10, such an 
assumption appears inacceptable in the concerned cases. 
It seems impossible to view ‘S means ….’ and ‘S means 
that ….’ as functors which map meanings or meaning 
contents to themselves. !e incongruousness could also 
be manifested by pointing out that, since a meaning rela-
tion depends on the connected relata, it cannot specify its 
nature by occurring itself as an item connected by the very 
same relation to a particular linguistic item. Apparently 
this consideration is invoked in verse 4.
Although – in view of the vagueness of linguistic re-
presentation exhibited by the verse – absolute certainty is 
impossible, the writer of the text might have been aware 
of the fact that for explanatory meaning statements not 
mere references to both linguistic and semantic items but 
representing references are required. !e occurrence of the 
expression svadharmeᒤa would in fact indicate the exis-
tence of an awareness to that eFect if it had been intended 
to suggest by that expression that for a speci+cation of 
the individual nature of a meaning relation, and possibly 
of relations in general, all the related items need to be 
completely determined. Possibly the occurrence of that 
expression should perform various functions at the same 
time. In that case the absence of a more straightforward 
indication of the self-referential ingredient of the pertinent 
theorem could be even better explained.
If the preceding deliberations are accepted, it can be 
contended that not only explanatory items but sentences 
expressing some content in general cannot perform the 
following two functions at the same time: a) expressing 
some content and b) expressing the fact that the sentence 
expresses the content in question. Although the verses 23 
and 24 appear in the context of a reply to an objection, 
it is probable that they were meant to support this claim.
!ey are at least objectively suited to substantiate that 
contention. !ey read as follows:
na hi saᒢśayarūpe ‘rthe śeᒲatvena vyavasthite /
avyudāse svarūpasya saᒢśayo ‘nyaᒒ pravartate
yadā ca nirᒤayajñāne nirᒤayatvena nirᒤayaᒒ /
prakramyate tadā jñānaᒢ svadharme nāvatiᒲᒷhate
For regarding an object which has the nature of a doubt and 
is subordinate [with respect to its object] no other doubt is 
operative in so far as it does not lose its own nature.
And when cognition of ascertainment is ascertained as an 
ascertainment then the cognition does not persist in its 
own character.
!ese two verses bring in analogical examples from the 
domain of mental phenomena for which correlations with 
the area of linguistic facts can be construed as follows:
(I) If some linguistic item expresses a certain meaning 
content it does not automatically generate an operation of 
expressing that it expresses the content in question Û If a 
doubt of +rst order arises a doubt of second order does not 
arise together with it (at the same time).
(II) If it happens that some linguistic item expresses a state-
ment concerning that which some linguistic item expresses 
then the content of that statement necessarily diFers from 
the content that is expressed by the item whose meaning 
content is being assessed Û !e nature of a second order 
ascertainment necessarily diFers from the nature of the 
corresponding +rst order ascertainment because of the dif-
ference of their contents.
!e importance of (II) derives from the fact that, 
as long as linguistic units are supposed to be free from 
ambiguities, the supposition that some unit U expresses 
that P and some unit U* expresses that U expresses that 
P necessitates the consequence that U and U* are (nu-
merically) diFerent. If, on the other hand, the possibility 
of ambiguities were admitted, it still follows that at any 
time there must exist some content of some linguistic 
token about which the fact that it expresses the content 
in question remains unexpressed, provided the following 
10. For example in the case of P and It is true that P this supposition is not absurd – although not uncontroversial. 
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possibilities are not admitted: (i) Some item expresses an 
actual in+nity of meaning contents or (ii) actually in+nity 
chains of linguistic units commenting on other linguistic 
units occur. Given that meaning relations are acknowled-
ged as possible objects it follows that the proposition that 
everything which exists at some time can also be named 
or designated at that time cannot hold good.
!e verses 23 and 24 of the SS defend a contention 
resulting as a consequence of the impossibility of self-
explanatory items. It says that both producers of linguistic 
tokens and their interpreters pursue only that which those 
tokens mean, i.e. they, as producers, express some meaning 
content, and as interpreters (try to) grasp the content 
which is meant or expressed.
Does, however, not happen that, in addition to it, 
they with the very same words express something about 
the connection between the concerned linguistic tokens 
and their meaning or try to assess the connection by this. 
!e relevant contention is presented in verse 19, after 
a digression about the possibility of the occurrence of 
restrictions pertaining to individual expressions and their 
speci+c meanings. !is verse reads as follows:
prāptiᒢ tu samavāyākhyāᒢ vācyadharmātivartinīm /
prayoktā pratipattā vā na śabdair anugacchati
Yet neither the utterer nor the hearer approaches through 
words the [relation of ] attainment [between words and 
their objects] called “inherence”, which goes beyond the 
characteristics that are to be expressed.
!is proposition invites contradiction. Doesn’t it vio-
late its own maxim by attempting to impart something 
about its own meaning relation by making the general 
claim that the relationship between linguistic items and 
their own meaning or content is not their topic? !ere 
can be no doubt that the author of the SS was fully 
aware of the predicament because he not only presented 
the diLculty in the form of an objection, in the verses 
20-21, but also attempts to respond to the criticism. It 
can be presumed that the response to the objection com-
prises the whole section of the verses 22-28 of which the 
above quoted stanzas form a part. !is last hypothesis is, 
however, confronted with a problem which is rooted in 
verse 25. According to a customary interpretation this 
verse presents a reference to a truth paradox – which is 
usually designated in a somewhat infelicitous manner 
by the term ‘Liar Paradox’. It had been even contended 
that the section of verse 25 and the subsequent ones up 
to verse 29 present (the attempt of) a solution of the so-
called Liar Paradox. If those readings were correct it could 
not be any longer maintained that the textual segment 
that is the topic of the present investigation is exclusively 
dedicated to the issue of meaning and meaning relations. 
!e crucial stanza 25 reads as follows:
sarvaᒢ mithyā bravīmīti naitad vākyaᒢ vivakᒲyate /
tasya mithyābhidhāne hi prakrānto rtho na gamyate
[With the words:] “Everything [which I speak] I speak 
falsely” this sentence is not intended to be meant. For if it 
is said falsely the intended object is not attained.
!e above mentioned ‘conventional interpretation’ 
hypothesizes that the expression sarvaᒢ mithyā bravīmi 
is equivalent to ‘Everything which I say is false’. !e 
consequence which the verse proposes should be that 
for the sake of avoiding an inconsistency the pertinent 
statement itself must be excluded from the domain of 
the universal quanti+cation. !is reading causes trouble 
due to the circumstance that a) it is inexplicable why the 
sequence of thoughts should suddenly shift to a diFerent 
topic and b) the problem which allegedly is the topic of 
the pertinent textual segment is dealt with in a comple-
tely unsatisfactory, if not super+cial, manner. But is this 
understanding mandatory?
!e reason why this reading is not obligatory lies in the 
circumstance that the expression mithyā is not a synonym 
of the predicates ‘is false’, ‘is untrue’ in the veridical sense 
of those words. To be sure, if the adverbial expression 
mithyā relates to matters of truth, in can be frequently 
rendered by the word ‘false’ in English. In other contexts 
equivalents such as ‘untruthful’ could be appropriate. !e 
decisive point is that the use of the expression mithyā is 
by no means restricted to the veridical aspect. Presumably 
it possesses a far broader lexical import encompassing 
phenomena of misleadingness or deceptiveness in general. 
If this is correct, no compelling reason exists to relate the 
pertinent occurrence of the term to the dimension of 
truth instead of meaning. In connection with linguistic 
items this diFerence amounts to the contrast between 
their capacity of pretending truth despite of actual un-
truth on the one hand and the possibility that linguistic 
units, in particular linguistic tokens, induce erroneous 
suppositions regarding their actual meaning. Given that 
mithyā in the context of sarvaᒢ mithyā bravīmi relates 
to misleadingness with respect to meaning, the sentence 
as a whole could represent either a statement to the eFect 
that the speaker in fact never intends to communicate that 
which the meanings of the words used by him suggest or 
that the words in the mouth of the speaker possess always 
a meaning that diFers from their conventional meaning. 
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It is easy to see that if those hypotheses were applied to 
the pertinent utterance itself the basis for its interpretation 
would be destroyed. !e possibility of my expressing by 
using words, which conventionally mean that my words 
never mean what they conventionally mean, requires that 
at least the words uttered on this occasion are interpreted 
in accordance with their conventional meaning. On the 
other hand, the possibility of somebody’s imparting to 
others the fact that he never intends to say what he appears 
to say in the light of established linguistic conventions by 
using expressions which possess this meaning requires that 
at least in the pertinent context of communication the 
speaker can be taken to mean what he appears to mean. 
Otherwise communicative success would be thwarted. 
Its objective can be realized without hindrance at best if 
it were exempt from the generalization.
!e formulation of the verse provides support for 
this reading due to the occurrence of the expression na 
gamyate. In contrast to virudhyate the words na gamya-
te do not indicate the slightest allusion to any idea of 
inconsistency or incompatibility. On the other hand the 
sequence prakrānto ‘rtho na gamyate is perfectly suited 
to convey the idea of communicative failure. It is even 
conceivable that the pertinent occurrence of the term 
artha- had been intentionally employed with a double 
import: a) in the sense of ‘meaning’ for conveying the 
idea of failure of expressing the content which needs to 
be expressed, b) in the sense of ‘purpose’ for imparting 
the thought that without hypothesizing a restriction with 
respect to the generality of the statement, the realization 
of the intended communicative goal would be obstructed.
In this manner the remark of verse 25 smoothly 
blends in the argumentative context. !e connection is 
as follows: In the same manner as verse 19 the sentence 
sarvaᒢ mithyā bravīmi represents (at least in one reading) 
a general statement pertaining to the relationship between 
expressions and their meanings, or, if not this, then at 
least to the relation between expressions and that which 
their users mean by using them. If this statement would 
(among others) relate to the formulation of the statement 
itself, its actual meaning would become inscrutable or the 
communicative goal of communicating some pertinent 
piece of information would be thwarted. But, as a matter 
of fact, the meaning of sarvaᒢ mithyā bravīmi can be 
assessed and those words can be even used for expressing 
some possible state of aFairs. !us the conclusion must 
be drawn that the making of a general statement where 
some ascription could be related to the statement’s for-
mulation itself is not tantamount to the ascription of a 
property to a plurality of items involving its ascription 
to the formulation in particular. As in the case of con-
versational implicatures in general, the communication 
of the thought that everything uttered by some speaker 
is not meant in its usual sense apart from the pertinent 
utterance itself rests on the possibility to identify some 
established linguistic meaning and recognizing that, by 
hypothesizing the most straightforward reading, principles 
of rationality of linguistic behaviour would be violated. 
But in the case of items like sarvaᒢ mithyā bravīmi the 
possibility of imparting a not straightforward import 
derives from the very nature of sentences expressing gene-
rality and universal quanti+cations. !us it emerges that 
established linguistic conventions play a central role by 
being employed as a means of communicating thoughts, 
including propositions pertaining to matters of meaning.
!e same point could not be made with the same 
degree of strength if the expression mithyā were taken as 
relating to untruth. An assertoric sentence which is being 
used to disclaim among others truth with respect to itself 
generates a threat of inconsistency. But the very possibi-
lity of recognizing this threat presupposes the possibility 
of attributing to the sentence a meaning and an import 
which entails the self-referential truth-denial11
!is expedient of defending the consistency of the 
remark embodied in verse 19 by pointing out a fact about 
the nature of sentences expressing generality or universal 
quanti+cations generates itself a most acute problem.
!e conclusion that the statement of that verse and 
possibly even the general thesis concerning the impossi-
bility of self-explanatory sentences should be interpreted 
in a manner according to which the pertinent items are 
themselves exempt from the general rule. But this certainly 
militates against the actual intention underlying those 
assertions. It should be surmised that the remark of verse 
19 possesses a character that is analogous to that of the 
statement of a proponent of linguistic compositionality, 
if he says:
11. In Coward/Kunjunni-Raja 1990:158 a paraphrase of verse 25 is oFered which reads as follows: 
 To take another case: in saying “all that I am saying is false” (sarvaᒢ mithyā bravīmi) one does not intend to include that very sentence in 
the scope of its meaning, for then, as what one is saying would be implicitly false, the intended meaning would not be conveyed. 
 Do not the diLculties to extract from this presentation a fairly plausible thought content – why, for example, should one believe that if someone 
says something which is false (either explicitly or even implicitly) no ‘intended meaning’ is conveyed? – present a suLcient reason for mistrusting 
portrayals of this kind? 
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!e meaning of a complex expression is determined by the 
meanings of its immediate constituents and the mode of 
composition11.12
!e advocate of compositionality does surely not in-
tend to assert that the rule holds true with respect to all 
other linguistic items except the one that formulates the 
theorem itself. !e contention is rather that the principle 
of compositionality, if it is correct at all, is equally valid for 
the complex expression by which the principle is formula-
ted. On the other hand, one can recognize that, although 
the theorem should pertain to all complex expressions 
of a(n arbitrary natural) language without exception, it 
does not formulate a claim concerning the formulation 
of the principle in particular. It does not even contain 
any singular term referring to the particular meaning of 
the expression by which the theorem is formulated. One 
can rather ascertain that by expressing a general maxim 
it implies that a certain property must hold true of the 
expression formulating the theorem itself. !e same fact 
could be brought to light also in the following manner. 
By saying:
(A) An assertion does (by itself ) not provide a proof of its 
truth.
one asserts something which implies that it is true 
even of (A) itself that it does not provide a proof of its 
truth. Given that the implied proposition is in fact true 
the general assertion can be assessed as true without im-
posing any restriction on its generality in the domain of 
assertions. Nevertheless, (A) does not ascribe any speci+c 
quality to itself in particular. Apart from the quality 
which allegedly holds true of assertions in general it does 
not provide information about any speci+c property of 
the assertion which is made by an utterance of the above 
quoted sequence of words. !e presumption that the 
defence of the statement of stanza 19 does not end with 
verse 25 has been indicated before. Now, verse 27 of the 
SS reads as follows:
asādhikā pratijñeti neyam evābhidhīyate /
yathā tathāsya dharmo ‘pi naiva kaścit pratīyate
Just as [with the words:] “An assertion is not proving” this 
very assertion is not designated in the same manner also no 
characteristic of it is ascertained [there].
Without going into further details of the interpretation 
of that stanza, the following can be de+nitely said: If this 
remark was meant to impart exactly the point which 
had been highlighted in connection with (A), then the 
writer of the SS would have successfully accomplished the 
defence of his assertion propagated in verse 19. None of 
the remarks made in the previous segments of the SS – 
according to the interpretation advocated here – militates 
against the supposition that linguistic items can express 
propositions which imply truths regarding their own 
meaning as well as the relationship between themselves 
and their content. Both the theorem of the impossibility 
of self-explanatory sentences and its corollary represented 
in stanza 19 demand only that a linguistic item cannot 
express something which involves a speci+cation of their 
own meaning, i.e. a proposition which entails that the 
concerned linguistic unit possesses the speci+c meaning 
which it actually has.
In contrast, the entire section of SS 1-29 does not 
even furnish the beginning of an adequate account of 
truth paradoxes. In this connection the fact is important 
that truth paradoxes do not exclusively arise in the case of 
sentences which express a direct ascription of (veridical) 
falsehood or denial of truth with respect to themselves. 
!ey are also observable in cases of indirect truth denials, 
for example, if some item (I) attributes truth to some item 
(I*) which in its turn ascribes lack of truth with respect 
to (I). Moreover, the so-called ‘Yablo-Paradox’ calls into 
question that direct or indirect self-reference (of the perti-
nent kind) is a compulsory prerequisite for the formation 
of truth paradoxes. It appears that the minimum required 
for a satisfactory account of truth paradoxes consists in 
the examination of a principle which, notwithstanding a 
prima facie appearance of plausibility, calls for a critical 
appraisal. It reads as follows:
If somebody says that P, then he (thereby) says so-
mething which is true if and only if (it is the case that) P.
or alternatively:
If some linguistic unit (in particular a declarative 
sentence) U expresses that P, then U (thereby) expresses 
something which is true if and only if (it is the case that) P.
As a +rst step towards an adequate treatment of the 
pertinent issue it is appropriate to split up the principle 
by dissecting the biconditional. It should go without 
saying that the SS does not contain the slightest trace of 
such considerations.
12. Or in another formulation: 
 !e meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings of its parts and of the syntactic rules by which they are combined. 
 Cf. Partee/Meulen/Wall 1990:318. 
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Conclusion
!e above presented interpretation of the section of the 
verses 1-29 of the SS diFers considerably from previous 
readings both in the ancient Indian and in the Western 
tradition. !is could induce the belief that the interpreta-
tion cannot be correct. But its dismissal on that account 
alone can hardly be accepted. As long as an exegesis 
does not depend on far-fetched assumptions regarding 
philological and linguistic matters the fact that it entails 
that the remarks encountered in a textual source rest on 
a sound theoretical basis justi+es its claim for serious 
consideration. !e reason lies in the circumstance that, 
generally, exegetically relevant import is underdetermined 
by linguistic meaning and grammatical matters. !is in 
its turn is due to the circumstance that identi+cation of 
communicative goals depends on an interplay between 
language-speci+c rules and conventions, exploitation of 
ordinary or theoretical knowledge and presumption of ra-
tionality of linguistic behaviour. Whereas a carpet cleaner 
is a device for cleaning carpets a vacuum cleaner is not a 
device for cleaning vacuum. Whereas a sentence, such as
(7) Everybody has been born at some time.
does not call for an interpretation implying a restriction 
in the domain of (human) living beings, the situation is 
diFerent in the case of items like:
(8) Everybody is liable to pay income tax.
Many other examples could be brought in for demons-
trating the same point. Even if such phenomena are suited 
to indicate limitations of principles of compositionality 
they cannot disprove that compositionality holds good for 
some varieties of meaning or sense. But a decision about 
this question is not needed for defending the claim that 
considerations concerning theoretical soundness play an 
important role for the assessment of interpretations in the 
realm of theoretical treatises irrespective of the tradition 
to which they could be allocated.
!e circumstance that assessments of theoretical va-
lidity demand the identi+cation of theoretical problems 
which must be detected in the investigated textual sources 
themselves and cannot be straightforwardly imported 
from diFerent sources of another or the same tradition 
of thought can partly explain the neglect of this aspect in 
the case of the SS and in studies on Indian philosophical 
texts in general. But presumably other factors are equally 
pertinent.
It is sometimes intimated that questions of theoretical 
motivation disregard the most important and essential 
component which, in the case of Indian philosophies, 
allegedly lies in religious endeavours to promote spiritual 
perfection and salvation. !is argument is beset by the 
Kaw of a confusion of levels. An astronomer can be moti-
vated in his profession by religious aspirations because he 
views his enterprise as an exploration of the mysteries of 
divine creation. A mathematician could be stimulated to 
develop theoretical accounts of actual in+nities because he 
believes that in this way he might be able to demonstrate 
the consistency of the idea of an in+nite being. But this 
does not rule out that both theoreticians attempt to com-
ply with most rigorous scienti+c standards and even expect 
that their theoretical statements are evaluated by others 
under the aspect of theoretical soundness. !e objection 
based on the argument of an essentially religious character 
of Indian philosophies is too super+cial for deserving a 
detailed appraisal.
!ere is, however, still another possible factor facili-
tating a dismissal of theoretical considerations. It is the 
idea that theoretical rationality is a distinctively Western 
phenomenon which is apt to promote a denigration of the 
relevance of theoretical aspects in the area of Non-Western 
traditions of thought. In the +nal analysis a rejection of 
this stance does not require the premise of the falsity of 
the thesis that the existence of theoretical rationality – or 
even of rationality in general – is restricted to the West, 
although it seems that it is in fact blatantly false. !e de-
cisive point is rather that verdicts about the non-existence 
of certain types of rationality in some foreign tradition 
cannot be a presupposition but at best an outcome of 
detailed research. If such research should be worthwhile 
at all, it must be carefully designed in such a manner that 
its results do not depend on either a positive or negative 
prejudice in that regard.
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